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ABSTRACT
Thispaper estimates the effect of union work rules in the building
trades on employment and costs by comparing factor demand elasticities for
union and nonunion contractors and subcontractors over micro data from two
different types of construction. The results show that the elasticities
of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs and own-price elasticities
for nonlabor inputs are about the same for union and nonunion contractors.
In contrast, the elasticities of substitution among different skill categories
of labor and the own-price elasticities for each category are much lower under
unionism. A simulation based on a typical office building subcontract shows
that these lower factor demand elasticities result in excess staffing of
3.2 percent, excess labor costs of 5.0 percent, and excess total costs of 2.0
percent. This study also examines directly the effect of union work rules on
the use of prefabricated components and finds that union contractors are just







unions had shackled the industry with make-work rules
and jurisdictional distinctions even more preposterous,
perhaps, than the restrictions that have all but ruined
the railroads.
"ATime of Reckoning
for the Building Unions,"
Fortune, June 4, 1979,
p. 82.
The conventional view of union work rules in construction stated above
is that they result in excessive manning and technological stagnation. This
view largely originates from journalistic accounts of such horror stories as
the journeyman assigned to operate an automatic elevator and the master
mechanic who earned $90,000 one year without touching his wrench. Many non-
academic studies of the issue, frequently funded by business groups, reinforce
this view. For instance, the Business Roundtable (BR) recently conducted a
major study of construction industry productivity. The overall tone of their
report was described in these terms by the Wall Street Journal, "Although the
Roundtable spreads blame for the productivity problem widely, it clearly thinks
the principal culprit is organized labor."1
This is difficult to reconcile with the results of academic research
designed to measure the impact of work rules on factor allocation. Surveys of
actual work practices in the 1950s and 1970s concluded the impact of union work
rules on efficiency had been vastly overestimated in popular accounts. This is
consistent with the conclusions of my quantitative estimates of productivity
differences between union and nonunion contractors in Mlen (1983, l984a).
Although these estimates did not consider work rules explicitly, it2
is difficult to reconcile my findings of generally higher productivity in union
construction with highly restrictive work practices.
This paper directly estimates the impact of union work rules in construction
by comparing factor demand elasticities for union and nonunion contractors. The
hypothesis that work rules produce lower demand elasticities in the union sector
was proposed by Freeman and Medoff. Union work rules either specify situations
in which certain inputs cannot be used (occupational jurisdictions, restrictions
on subcontracting, prefabrication, or certain types of equipment) or restrict
the quantity of inputs (foremen or apprentice ratios, minimum crew sizes).In
either case managers have less flexibility to select the least-cost combination
of inputs. As a result, union contractors cannot adjust input quantities to a given
differential in input prices as much as nonunion contractors, resulting in lower
own—price elasticities and elasticities of substitution under unionism. Freeman
and Medoff call this the relative inelasticity hypothesis.2
This study focuses on contractor behavior in samples of micro data in
commercial office building and elementary and secondary school construction.
These data sets are especially well-suited for testing the relative inelasticity
hypothesis because the product and the technology are identical within each sample.
This was not the case for the two-digit manufacturing industry data used by Freeman
and Medoff. As a result they could not reject the possibility that their finding
of lower demand elasticities under unionism was attributable to decisions by unions
to organize sectors within each two-digit industry that had the lowest factor demand
elasticities (so as to minimize the adverse employment effects of higher wages),
rather than to the impact of union work rules. Since contractors are price takers
in local labor markets, this study also avoids the simultaneity between price and
quantity determination involved with most studies of factor demand elasticities.3
The focus here is solely upon factor misallocation resulting from union work
rules, as opposed to that resulting from union-nonunion wage gaps. The latter
issue cannot be addressed without carefully standardizing for labor quality
differences between union and nonunion labor. Such standardization is not
necessary for this study. Even though my earlier studies show more labor
services are embodied in an hour of union labor, this will not bias the
elasticity estimates. Although the union contractors would make smaller adjust-
ments in the number of hours for a given type of labor in response to a difference
in relative prices, the percentage adjustment in hours relative to thepercentage
adjustment in prices would not be affected by this consideration.
This study also reports direct evidence on the effect of union work rules
involving prefabrication. General contractors in a survey of hospitals and nursing
homes were asked whether 15 different types of prefabricated components were used.
The possible restrictive impact of unionism is gauged by comparing the questionnaire
responses of union and nonunion contractors and by estimating prefabrication
probability equations relating the usage of prefabricated components to unionism,
wage rates, size and type of building, and other control variables.
This paper is organized in the following fashion. Section II reviews the
literature on restrictive union work practices in construction. Section III
describes the procedures used to estimate factor demand elasticities; Section IV,
the data.I initially assume labor inputs are separable from capital and materials
and present results on aggregated labor, capital, and materials in Section V.
Differences in demand elasticities by union status for skilled labor, supervisory
labor, and unskilled labor are reported in Section VI. The separability
restrictions are tested in Section VII and results from models without those4
restrictions are discussed. Section VIII contains a simulation of the effect
of union work rules as manifested by differences in factor demand elasticities
on factor demand, costs, and productivity. Union-nonunion differences in
prefabrication are examined in Section IX. The results are summarized and
evaluated in Section X.
II. Previous Research
Two approaches have been used in previous studies to determine the effect
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first approach union contracts are examined to see if they contain restrictive
language. This method can produce misleading conclusions because management and
the union may agree to ignore the contract provisions. Even if the contract is
followed, the restrictions need not be costly. On large jobs, minimum crew size
provisions are not going to be binding constraints.In some cases excess labor
can be used outside craft lines. On the other hand, restrictive practices may
be followed at the work site even though they are not required by the contract.
The second approach is to interview union officials, union and open—shop
contractors, and construction owners to determine which practices are actually
being followed. This allows the researcher to determine whether the work rules
in the contract are actually costly and whether practices not mentioned in the
contract are imposing additional constraints. Both approaches are limited in one
key respect--ad hoc assumptions about staffing requirements and factor demand
elasticities have to be made to determine the quantitative impact of these
provisions.
The most comprehensive study of contract provisions is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' (BLS) examination of 769 agreements for 16 building trades unions5
in the 66 largest SMSAs in 1972-73. The percentage of workers covered by each
of nine productivity-related contract provisions is reported for each of ten
major unions and for all 16 unions together in Table 1.Minimumcrew size
provisions and requirements for a foreman after a given number of workers are
hired are the most widespread practices with potentially adverse effectson
productivity. Crew size restrictions cover over one-third of all workers and
over two-thirds of bricklayers, ironworkers, electrical workers, and operating
engineers. This could reduce the own-price elasticity of skilled labor and the
elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and other inputs on small jobs.
About 60 percent of the contracts require foremen after so many workers are
hired, with over half of these requiring a foreman after one to three workers.
This could reduce the own-price elasticity of supervisory labor and the elasticity
of substitution between supervisors and other types of labor on small jobs.In
addition, 26.5 percent of the contracts contain foreman-to-journeymanratios,
which could reduce this elasticity for jobs in all size categories.
Considerably less widespread are 'provisions limiting prefabrication, tools
and equipment, the ability of employers (usually subcontractors) to work with
tools, and the use of non-bargaining unit personnel. These provisios are
clustered within a few trades. Prefabrication limits cover 70 percent of the
plumbers and 77 percent of the sheet metal workers. Limits on tools cover
83 percent of the painters (maximum brush size). Restrictions on the use of tools
by employers are most often found in the contracts of painters, plumbers, and
electrical workers. Three-fourths of the sheet metal workers are covered by
contracts restricting the use of non-bargaining unit personnel. Nearly half of


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































amount of work performed per day or bar resistance to technological improvements
or labor-saving devices. Such provisions are rarely found, however, in agree-
ments covering painters or sheet metal workers. Since these sets of provisions
are not widely observed, it will be difficult to assess their impact over samples
that are pooled across various trades.3
As part of a larger study examining all aspects of productivity, BR (1982a)
examined a sample of agreements in effect in 1979 representing 20 percent of all
agreements and covering almost half of the union work force.4 It found almost
20 percent of their sample contracts contained crew size restrictions. Most
ironworker contracts contained such restrictions, along with a substantial propor-
tion of boilermaker and operating engineer agreements. Assuming management would
utilize 10 percent fewer workers for 10 percent of the tasks assigned to these
crafts, BR estimated crew size provisions result in an annual excess cost of
$42 million. In comparison, the BLS study found much greater use of these
restrictions in its 1972-73 sample. 0ff-site fabrication restrictions were found
in only a minor proportion of all contiracts but in about half of the pipefitter
or plumber agreements. This results in an annual excess cost of $30 million,
using assumptions identical to those in the crew size case above.5
BR (1982b) cites exclusive jurisdiction as "the greatest...current
handicap faced by union contractors,' (p. i) not only because of distortions
in factor mixes but also because of disputes among unions. A Stanford University
survey done for BR found these problems to be especially severe in the unloading
and storage of materials, operation of small equipment, and installation of
scaffolding and supports. BR (1982c) argued that restrictions on the use of
semiskilled and unskilled workers may raise costs as much as 20 percent. Although8
the quantitative basis for all these claims and estimates is quite weak,
they all suggest that factor demand elasticities are much lower in union
construction.
The most thorough interview study was done in 1952 by Haber and Levinson.
They interviewed 268 representatives of labor, management, and government in
16 cities to determine, among other things, how receptive labor unions were to
new techniques, how widespread union work rules were, and how much impact they
had on costs. While their back-of-the envelope calculations concluded union work
rules raise costs by 3 to 8 percent, they noted "the building trades unions
have been more receptive to new techniques than has been widely believed" (p. 153)
and that "an over-all evaluation of the extent and importance of union working
rules strongly suggests that their adverse impact is much less than has been
widely alleged" (p. 189). Three fourths of their cost estimate is attributed to
restrictions on the employment of different types of labor, whereas the remainder
is attributed to restrictions on techniques.
Mandelstamm obtained cost and man-hour estimates for a standard small house
from contractors in two Michigan cities in 1957: one heavily unionized and the
other dominated by open-shop contractors. Contractors were also asked how their
man-hours estimates were influenced by work rules and technological restrictions.
Except for paint spray guns and prefabricated parts manufactured by nonunion labor,
Mandelstamm found no union opposition to labor-saving techniques. In fact, other
new techniques were utilized more frequently in the unionized city, a factor
Mandelstarnm attributed to better management. Mandelstamm found the only work
rules with any restrictive effects were minimum crew sizes to lift glass, limits
on overtime work, and a requirement to hire local men on jobs outside their
home base. He found no evidence of organized slowdowns, absolute restrictions9
on output, insistence on unnecessary quality, barriers to discharge, or limits
on working contractors. He concluded, "Although no reliable quantitative
estimate can be made of the effect of these rules on efficiency, their total
impact would appear to be very small" (p. 512).
More recently Bourdon and Levitt's survey of union and nonunion contractors
in eight cities in 1976 found relatively few restrictive work practices in the
union sector. Operating engineers and ironworkers set strict limits on the number
of workers for a given job; the mechanical trades were very restrictive on work
performed off-site. Such rules tend to be irrelevant for large projects, but
they impose costly constraints on small specialty contractors. Even in these
cases, rules are often ignored or loosely interpreted to fit the context. No
work-rule restrictions were reported by 55 percent of the contractors interviewed.
Another 92 percent said there were no restrictions on materials; 95 percent
on tools. The only such restrictions that tended to be observed involved nonunion
prefabricated products.
According to the union contractors interviewed by Bourdon and Levitt, the
major restriction imposed by union work rules was that they rarely allowed workers
to cross trade lines. Only 27 percent of the union contractors said that their
workers crossed trade lines "occasionally to often," while 43 percent said
"rarely'and 30percent said "never." In contrast, 82 percent of the nonunion
contractorsresponded "occasionally to often" and only 18 percent said "never."
The authors concluded, "Thereis no question that at various times and places,
various locals of the building trades unions have resisted technological innovation
in tools or materials and have established unduly restrictive work rules or
practices. Yet, the results of the survey, as of other field research, do10
not support the contention that this has been a widespread or consistent
policy' (p. 63).
What are the common themes in all of these findings? First, despite popular
conceptions, most union contracts are not riddled with provisions that seriously
interfere with factor allocation. Second, the interview studies indicate many
rules look more restrictive on paper than they are in practice because either
they do not generally impose binding constraints or they are not followed. Third,
although most trades seem relatively free of restrictive work practices, certain
problem areas keep popping up in almost all of the studies summarized above.
These include limits on prefabrication in plumbing and sheet metal work, limits
on tools and equipment in painting, crew size limits among ironworkers and
operating engineers, and restrictions on the use of tools by employers in electrical
work. Fourth, the two most recent studies both concluded the major work rule
problem facing employers today was the exclusive jurisdiction system. Contractors
strongly believed they could significantly reduce manhour requirements if they
could assign workers to tasks outside their craft's jurisdiction and make greater
use of semiskilled and unskilled labor.
III. Specification
Estimates of union and nonunion factor demand elasticities are obtained from
translog cost system parameters. This allows elasticites of substitution between
factors to vary. The cost function is written:






where C =cost,Y =output,and =priceof factor i, i =1,...,n.Two sets
of restrictions are imposed in all cases:(1) symmetry = and(2) degree
one homogeneity of the cost function with respect to prices
=1; =0; = =
Yij
=0.
The partial derivatives of (1) with respect to factor prices are the demand
equations for each factor, that is C/aP =Xi.In logarithms this becomes
by
alnC/alnP.=rn= Si,
where S. =shareof factor i in total cost. In the translog case,
S1 = + mY+-y1nP. (2)
Since both the cost function and the share equations contain information about
the parameters of interest, they are jointly estimated below by iterated seemingly
unrelated regression. One share equation is dropped to make the covariance
matrix of the disturbances nonsingular. This produces maximum likelihood estimates
that are invariant to the choice of which share equation is dropped.
Elasticities of substitution (an) and own-price demand elasticities
are computed from the estimates of (1) and (2) using the formulae
=(y.. +
= (1÷ S(S1 —l))/S
With (1) and (2) estimated separately by union status, and can be compared
for union and nonunion contractors. Two hypotheses about union and nonunion demand12
elasticities are tested. The first hypothesis is the equality of all union
and nonunion coefficients. This is done by examining the likelihood ratio
=(Il/I)2
where =determinantof the disturbance covariance
matrix for the pooled specification, =thesame determinant for the specifi-
cation with separate union and nonunion coefficients, and n =numberof contractors
in the sample. The test statistic —29nX has a chi-square distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions being tested. Conceivably,
the union and nonunion elasticities could be identical, even when the hypothesis
of equal cost and share equation coefficients is rejected. Accordingly, the second
test is to examine the difference between the elasticity estimates directly.
Superscripting union (nonunion) values by u(n), this involves testing whether




Standard errors of these differences are derived under two assumptions: (1) non-
stochastic S. and (2) E(o aj) =E(nn) =0.Under these assumptions the
ratio of the union-nonunion difference in elasticities to its estimated standard
error approximates the ratio of the union-nonunion difference in to its
estimated standard error.
A key issue in specifying the model is the separabil ity of labor from other
inputs. Five inputs are considered below: skilled labor (S), supervisory and
administrative labor (B), semiskilled and unskilled labor including apprentices
(U), materials (M), and equipment (K). If all five inputs are examined
simultaneoulsy, there are as many as 21 parameters to estimate from five
equations, a potentially extreme demand to place upon the data. Further,13
and, to a lesser extent, are subject to measurement error, biasing the
K and M elasticities downward and all other elasticities upward (because of the
homogeneity restrictions).
A natural procedure for reducing the burden upon the data andreducing
potential measurement error bias is to impose separability between the different
types of labor and nonlabor inputs and to estimate two models: one examining
labor (L), K, and M, where L is obtained by aggregating S. B, and U intoa single
input (KLM model) and the other examing S, B, and U as separate inputs while
ignoring K and M (BSU model). This reduces the number of free parameters per
model to 10 and the number of equations to three. Measurement error bias isno
longer a serious factor in the BSU model, although it is still present in the
KLM model. The risk involved with imposing separability is that theelasticity
estimates may turn out to be biased if different types of labor are not separable
from other inputs. Estimates both with and without the separability restrictions
are reported below.
One limitation of this procedure is that it assumes that factor quantities
are selected at points on the contractor's demand curve. In practice some union
work rules specify factor quantities well to the right of the demandcurve
(e.g. minimum crew size restrictions), which means the isoquants of union
contractors (as constrained by the work rules) contain flat segments and
discontinujtjes, especially at small levels of output. By assuming normally
distributed errors in the share equations, the model will be misspecified tosome
extent for the union contractors. The true union elasticities will be zero at
some points, whereas the model will impose a smooth, continuous structure on
the isoquants. Standard errors will be biased upwardly in the union sample.14
In spite of the limitations of the translog specification, the model can
approximate the curvature of isoquants under unionism and these results
can be compared to the curvature of nonunion isoquants in order to get at
the fundamental question of how much do union work rules matter in
determining factor quantities.
IV. Data
Two different data sets are examined: one containing 83 commercial office
buildings built in 1974 and the other containing 68 elementary and secondary
schools built in 1972. Both data sets were gathered by BLS as part of its
Construction Labor and Material Requirements series.I originally intended to
use individual contractors and subcontractors as observations for the estimation
of demand elasticities. Upon screening the data, I frequently found more than one
subcontractor involved in a particular type of operation. In many cases one
subcontractor provided only materials while others provided labor. Since focusing
on individual contractors in such cases would be quite misleading, I decided to
aggregate all subcontractors on a project doing the same type of work into a
single observation. General contractors are omitted because their output is
reported as the total value of the building rather than the value of the work
done by their crews. They cannot be included in the sample without imposing
homotheticity restrictions which, as will be shown below, are strongly rejected
by the data.6 This results in 823 union and 266 nonunion observations in the
office building sample; 806 union and 155 nonunion observations in the school
sample.
Each contractor reports the amount of the contract, union status, type
and cost of each material item, fair rental value or depreciation for each type
of equipment, and hours and wages for each occupation employed onsite.15
Since the focus here is on substitution patterns for onsiteinputs, interest
expenses are not included in capital costs. The cost measure used below is
total labor, material, and equipment costs in the KLM model; total laborcosts,
in the BSU model .Thecontract amount is used as the output measure in both
models.
Materials prices are not reported and must be constructed from othersources.
The 1973 Dodge Manual for Building Construction Pricing andScheduling reports a
materials price index for eighty cities. These were aggregated intonine indices
for each of the Census subregions, using 1972 construction employment ineach
city as weights. Since this index varies much more across rather than within
regions, this aggregation is unlikely to seriously contaminate the results.
Values of this variable for smaller geographic units could not be constructed
because, to protect the confidentiality of contractors, individual statesor
SMSAs are not identified in the data.
The school survey reports hours and costs for each type of equipment, but
only costs are reported for the office building sample. The capital price
variable used for the latter sample is the rate of return from the 1972 Census
of Construction Industries for each project's Census subregion. The ratioof
equipment costs to equipment hours is the theoretically appropriate capital
price measure for the school sample. Some contractors had no equipment costs.
To impute capital prices in those cases, the rnean-cost-.to-hours ratio for
the contractor's operation code (e.g., plumbing, carpentry,excavation, etc.)
is used.16
Factor prices also had to be imputed for occupational groups when they were
not used on a particular project. These were obtained from the coefficients
of an average hourly earnings equation estimated over each occupational group
used by each contractor with separate intercepts for each building, each
occupational group, and complete occupation-union interactions. The dependant
variable was specified in linear form. The results, reported in Table 2, are
generally consistent with what is known about the wage structure in the industry.
Apprentices and unskilled workers earn about the same amount within each sector.
Both qoups earn less than skilled workers, who in turn earn less than
supervisors. The union-nonunion wage gap is largest in percentage terms for
the least skilled occupations.
V. KLM Model Results
The shares of labor, materials, and capital for all samples are reported
in the first three lines of Table 3. The factor shares are quite similar for
office buildings and schools. Labor's share is about 40 percent; materials',
55 percent; capital 's, 5 percent. There is very little difference in the factor
shares for union and nonunion contractors. Despite higher union wages, labor's
share is near 40 percent for both union and nonunion contractors in both
samples.17
























































Note: Each equation also contains dummy variables for each project in the
sample. There are 82 such dumies in the office building sample and































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Materials' share is slightly higher for union contractors, whereas capital's
share is slightly lower.
Equality of the translog cost system parameters for union and nonunion
contractors is strongly rejected in both office building and school construction.
The test of equal union and nonunion coefficients involves 10 restrictions.
The critical chi-square value at the 99.5 percent confidence level for 10 degrees
of freedom is 25.2, well below the reported values of —2nX.
Conceivably, the coefficients are equal for union and nonunion
contractors but receive so little weight relative to the other seven restrictions
that pooling by union status is still rejected. A more stringent test is to drop
the cost function from the system. This leaves seven restrictions to test, three
involving coefficients. In this case, -2n is 14.62 for office buildings
and 64.76 for schools. Both tests reject pooling of union and nonunion observa-
tions at conventionally accepted significance levels.
The translog coefficients show the production function for subcontractors
in school and office building construction to be nonhomothetic and, in all but
one case, constant returns to scale. Labor and capital shares shrink with
output in both samples, with greater shrinkage among nonunion contractors.
Materials share is greater in large projects, once again with a larger rate of
increase with respect to project size in the nonunion sector. The hypothesis
of constant returns to scale can be rejected only for union school subcontractors.
They are subject to increasing (decreasing) returns for projects with value
added of more (less) than $9451. These results are somewhat different from
those I obtained in Allen (1984b) in which the unit of observation was theentjre
building project rather than individual contractors. This need not reflect21
aggregation bias in the earlier paper since general and miscellaneous
contractors are omitted here. The two exercises are also conceptually dif-
ferent, as the results in the other paper reflect not only the behavior of
subcontractors but also the coordination of many types of work going on at
once.
Even though pooling by union status is rejected, the estimates of factor
demand elasticities for labor, materials, and capital in Table 4 show no
particular pattern for union as opposed to nonunion contractors. In both
samples, there is little difference in the own price elasticity for labor by
union status, with all of the estimates falling between .51 and .66. The own
price elasticity for capital is somewhat larger for union contractors in both
samples, and the own price elasticity for materials is slightly larger for
nonunion contractors in the school sample, but the differences are not
statistically significant.
The elasticity of substitution estimates show labor and materials to be
substitutes in construction, as are materials and capital. Labor and capital
are complements for both union and nonunion contractors in office building
construction and for nonunion contractors in school construction. In union
school construction, labor and capital are substitutes. Out of the four cases
where factor pairs are substitutes for both union and nonunion contractors, the
nonunion elasticity is larger in three cases, but the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected in any of them.
A serio.s potential source of bias in the office building sample is
measurement error in the capital price proxy variable. The estimates are













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































associatedwith capital are much larger. This results in an upward bias inthe
other coefficients because of the homogeneity restrictions. It also makesit
more difficult to estimate accurately union-nonunion differences.
One way to roughly assess this bias is to re-estimate the modelover the
school sample using the capital price proxy in place of the correctmeasure.
The following elasticity estimates were obtained for the pooledsample:
Own—price Union—nonunion Elasticities of Union-nonunion
elasticities: difference: substitution: difference
Labor -.359 .075 Labor- .922 .429
(.069) (.177) materials (.135) (.370)
Materials -.582 .419 Labor- -3.753 .931
(.074) (.288) capital (.837) (1.767)
Capital —1.369 .316 Materials— 5.121 .416
(.558) (1.607) capital (1.036) (3.197)
The own price elasticity for capital is much larger inabsolute value in this
specification,as the estimate falls from .025 to -.017.The elasticities
ofsubstitution between capital and both labor and materials bear little
resemblance to the earlier estimates. This casts some doubt about the findings
of complementarity between labor and capital and a large materials-capital
elasticity in the office building sample.
Measurement error seems to have little effect on the finding of no difference
in elasticities by union status. All of the nonunion elasticities are larger
(but not significantly) than the union elasticities in this case, in contrast24
to only three out of six in Table 4. This suggests that if there is a bias in
the office building estimates of union-nonunion differences, it is in favor of
the relative inelasticity hypothesis.
In summary, there is no support for the hypothesis of lower factor demand
elasticities for union contractors in the KLM model. This is consistent with
the results of earlier academic studies. It also is consistent with the data
on contract provisions showing limits on prefabrication or on tools and equipment
to be relatively rare. This still leaves open the possibility of union work
rules restricting the quantity or even the types of labor that can be hired,
a matter that will now be examined.
VI. BSU Model Results
The allocation of different types of labor varies substantially by union
status. As shown in the first three lines of Table 5, the share of skilled
labor is substantially higher for union contractors. In the school sample,
skilled labor's share is 85 percent for union contractors versus 74 percent
for nonunion contractors. Skilled labor's share is 80 percent for union con-
tractors in the office building sample as opposed to 71 percent for nonunion
contractors. These differences may reflect lower prices for skilled relative
to unskilled labor under unionism or jurisdictional rules keeping unskilled
workers out of certain tasks.
Supervisory labor's share is slightly higher for union contractors in both
samples. This may result from minimum foreman requirements or the relatively
small difference between the wages of supervisory and other types of labor.
Unskilled labor's share is much smaller for union contractors in both samples.25
Table 5. Translog cost system estimates, BSU model
Elementaryand secondary schools jCoiwnercialofficebuildings
Sample Pooled Union
jNonunion Pooled Union Nonunion
Mean factor
shares:
Skilled .834 .852 .741 .778 .800 .709












































































































































































Elementaryand secondary schools Commercialoffice buildings
Sample Pooled Union Nonunion Pooled
IUnionI Nonunion
- .018 -.031 .051 -.001 .036 -.047
(.015) (.018) (.040) (.014) (.021) (.021)
-.0001 -.011 -.032 .022 .004 .032 U
(.013) (.015) (.036) (.013) (.018) (.019)
-.060 .054 -.072 -.097 -.018 -.139
(.034) (.038) (.088) (.035) (.043) (.065)
N 961 806 155 1089 823 266
—2nA 80.241 53.558
2627
Once again, equality of all ten union and nonunion coefficients is rejected
at extremely high confidence levels for the translog cost system. When the cost
function was deleted from the system and the hypothesis retested with seven
restrictions, pooling was still soundly rejected.8
The production function is nonhomothetic in all samples. The share of
supervisory labor increases with output in all cases. The share of skilled
labor falls with output for union contractors, but rises for nonunion con-
tractors. The share of unskilled labor falls with output in the nonunion
samples, but changes very little with output in the union samples.
How do own price elasticities for different types of labor and patterns
of labor-labor substitution differ between union and nonunion contractors?
These results, reported in Table 6, provide very strong support for the hypo-
thesis that union work rules reduce management's flexibility to assign workers
to jobs in the most efficient fashion. In five out of six cases, the own price
elasticities are larger for nonunion contractors and in three such cases the
differences are statistically significant from zero at a 90 percent or greater
confidence level.
The estimated differences are especially pronounced in the case of skilled
labor, as one would expect if occupational jurisdictions are the major restrictive
aspect of union work rules. In both samples this elasticity is more than twice
as large for nonunion contractors. In the school sample the elasticity for
skilled labor is -.15for union contractors as opposed to -.38for nonunion
contractors. The magnitudes of the estimates in the office building sample are
quite similar: -.17 for union contractors and -.46 for nonunion contractors.
The magnitudes of the union-nonunion differences in the own price elasticity






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































contractors in the school sample and -.95in the office building sample. In
contrast, they are -l .06 and -l .26, respectively, for nonunion contractors.
Although the estimated standard errors for the union-nonunion difference are
not small enough to reject the null hypothesis, the consistency of these results
from two different samples is striking.
The results for supervisory labor in the office building sample are also
consistent with the relative inelasticity hypothesis. The demand curve for
supervisory labor in the union sector is practically vertical, perhaps reflecting
foreman requirement rules. In contrast the demand elasticity is about -2.7
for nonunion contractors in this sample. Although this difference is significantly
different from zero, it is difficult to reconcile with the results from the
school sample in which the union elasticity is —2.1 .Thenonunion elasticity is
positive, but estimated with very little precision.
Elasticities of substitution also generally tend to be smaller in the
union sector. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labor is near 1.6 for nonunion contractors in both samples. In contrast, this
elasticity for union contractors in the school sample is 0.6; in the office
building sample, 1.1. However, the hypothesis of no difference in the estimates
in the office building sample cannot be rejected. This is also the case for the
supervisory-unskilled elasticity in that sample.
The two samples produced conflicting results for substitution between
skilled and supervisory workers. In the office building sample the union
elasticity is negative (but not significantly different from zero), whereas the
nonunion elasticity is 1.7. In contrast, the union elasticity in the school
sample is 2.8, whereas the nonunion elasticity was negative.30
All the elasticities for supervisory labor for nonunion school construction
seem unreliable. The elasticity of substitution between supervisory and
unskilled labor is negative and unaccountably large in magnitude, whereas the
own price elasticity is positive. If 1BB is too large and 1BU and are too
small ,theother nonunion elasticities are also biased because of the homogeneity
restrictions. Larger values of
TBLJandSB would imply either (1) larger own-
price elasticities for skilled or unskilled labor or (2) a smaller elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.
VII. Is Labor Separable from Other Inputs?
The results in the two preceding sections show the demand elasticities
for different types of labor and for labor-labor substitution are lower for union
than for nonunion contractors. In contrast, there is no difference by union status
in demand elasticities for nonlabor inputs and for substitution between aggregate
labor and nonlabor inputs. These results were obtained under the assumption of
separability between aggregate labor and nonlabor inputs. The separability
assumption requires the elasticities of substitution between the different types





Dennyand Fuss have developed tests of these restrictions. In this section,
I report the results of those tests. They show labor inputs are separable from
nonlabor inputs in the school sample but not in the office building sample.
I then report union-nonunion elasticity differences for both samples when the
separability restrictions are removed. Their removal has relatively little effect
on the office building results, but produces estimates in the school sample that
are difficult to believe (indicating their imposition was appropriate for that
sample).31
Denny and Fuss show the translog function is weakly separable between labor




The determinants of the error covariance matrix with and without these restrictions
are used to calculate log likelihood ratio test statistics. These are distributed
chi-square with 4 degrees of freedom. The results are as follows:
Sample: Test statistic: Significance level:
Office buildings 57.2 .999
Schools 6.5 .835
Weak separability is strongly rejected for office buildings but cannot be rejected
for schools. This suggests the LKM model produces misleading estimates of the
elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs for office buildings.
Other elasticity estimates may also be biased by the homogeneity restrictions.
The alternative procedure of estimating a five-factor translog cost system
has an equally serious limitation. The data may simply not be up to the task of
estimating three different elasticities of substitution between labor and capital
and three more for labor and materials, especially with measurement error in the
prices of capital and materials.
With this proviso in mind, turn now to the elasticity estimates in Table 7.
The five—factor model results for office buildings are similar to those
obtained in the previous section. Once again, labor demand elasticitiesare







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nonunion elasticities is somewhat larger in the five-factor model, especially
for the own price elasticities of supervisory and unskilled labor and all of
the substitution elasticities between different types of labor. The absolute
value of all nonunion elasticities involving supervisory labor is much larger
in the five-factor model. Some are so large, especially the elasticity of
substitution between supervisory and unskilled labor, that they cast doubt upon
all the nonunion elasticity estimates.
One important difference between the five-factor and BSU model results is
that all three types of labor are complements in the union sector. This suggests
that jurisdictional rules allow little substitution among different types of labor.
Each type of labor is substitutable for materials and two are substitutable
for capital, results roughly consistent with the KLM model estimates. Once
again, capital and materials elasticities do not differ by union status.
The rejection of separability implies the elasticities of substitution
between labor and nonlabor inputs should vary for different types of labor.
Recall in Table 4 that the elasticity of substitution between labor and materials
for the pooled sample was 1.1.In Table 6 the elasticity between materials and
skilled labor is 0.7; between materials and supervisory labor, 8.0; between
materials and unskilled labor, 1.8. The larger elasticity estimate for unskilled
labor is consistent with the notion of greater economies of prefabrication for
simple, repetitive tasks.I have no explanation for the extremely large
elasticity estimate for supervisory labor.
The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital for the pooled
sample is -1.8. In the case of skilled labor, this elasticity is 0.4; supervisory
labor, -75.9; unskilled labor, 1.1. Once again, the relative magnitude of the35
skilled and unskilled elasticities makes some sense, indicating construction
equipment is considerably less substitutable for the former. Apparently the
complementarity between supervisory labor and capital is so large that it
makes the aggregate labor elasticity somewhat misleading. The magnitude of the
supervisory labor elasticity at mean factor share values seems too large to
take seriously. When supervisory labor and capital's share are each 10 percent,
this elasticity becomes -4.2.
Even though the separability restrictions for schools cannot be rejected,
the five—factor model was also estimated over that sample to determine the
sensitivity of those results to an alternative specification. A larger nonunion
elasticity for unskilled labor and elasticity of substitution beten skilled
and unskilled labor are the only results at all consistent with the BSU and
KLM models. The supervisory labor elasticity estimates are more peculiar
here than in Table 6, casting considerable doubt upon the reasonableness of the
other elasticities. Since the separability restrictions cannot be rejected for
schools, I don't believe the five-factor model results merit serious consideration
in this case.
Because of the peculiar values of the elasticities for supervisory labor,
a four-factor model in which skilled and supervisory labor were aggregated and
examined along with unskilled labor, materials and capital was also estimated.
Weak separability of skilled and supervisory labor was strongly rejected for the
office building sample (-2nA =46.2)but could not be rejected for schools
(-2nx =3.6).The results are fairly similar to those in Table 7 and are
reported in Appendix Table A. Weak separability of the skilled-supervisory
aggregate and unskilled labor from capital and materials was rejected at about
the 90 percent confidence level for both samples (-2znx =4.9for offices and
4.5 for schools).36
VIII. The Cost of Union Work Rules
The above results show own-price elasticities for labor and labor-labor
substitution elasticities to be much lower for union contractors. How much of
an effect do lower elasticities have on employment patterns, costs and produc-
tivity? To illustrate the magnitude of these adjustments, the change in factor
allocation in the union sector resulting when wages fall to nonunion levels is
simulated, using both union and nonunion elasticities. The quality of union
labor available at union wage rates is assumed to be identical to that available
at nonunion rates. This allows the results of the simulation using union
elasticities to be interpreted as the magnitude of allocative inefficiency
resulting from higher union wages minus the magnitude of the technical ineffi-
ciency resulting from union work rules. The results obtained with nonunion
elasticities solely reflect the magnitude of the allocative inefficiency resulting
from union wages. By comparing these two sets of results, the magnitude of the
technical inefficiency resulting from union work rules can be determined.
The simulation is based on a commercial office building subcontract in which
output, costs of each input and hours of each type of labor equal their union
sample means. Wages for all three types of labor are assumed to fall from mean
union to mean nonunion values. This amounts to a 22.2 percent decrease for
skilled labor, 6.8 percent for supervisory, and 33.6 percent for unskilled.
Constant output cross-price elasticities are obtained from the formula
alnX1JalnP =Sia.
Since the KLM model found no difference by union status in elasticities of
substitution between labor and noniabor inputs, I base the simulation solely
on the BSU model results and ignore changes in capital and materials costs.37
In both simulations a fall in wages to nonunion levels results in reduced
employment of skilled and supervisory labor and increased employment of unskilled
labor. The adjustments are much larger when nonunion elasticities are used,
especially for skilled and supervisory labor. Under the union elasticities,
the quantity of labor hours demanded increases by 0.8 percent, reflecting a
shift from skilled to unskilled labor. Under the nonunion elasticities, the
quantity of labor hours demanded actually decreases by 2.4 percent. This implies
removal of union work rules would reduce staffing by 3.2 percent. Productivity
would increase by the same proportion.
Labor costs for the average union project are $60,907. If wages fell to
nonunion levels, costs would fall to $46,706 under union elasticities, a reduc-
tion of 23.3 percent. Under nonunion elasticities, labor costs faF to $44,388,
a reduction of 27.1 percent. The ratio of labor costs under nonunion elasticities
to those under union elasticities indicates that removal of union work rules could
reduce labor costs by 5.0 percent and total costs by 2.0 (5.0x .40, where .40
is labor's share of total cost) percent. These results are fairly consistent
with the findings of earlier academic studies. Although their magnitude is by no
means trivial, they create an impression quite different from that produced by
journalistic horror stories or studies by "experts'1 in the business community.
Another way of interpreting these results is that unions are willing to give up
5 percent of their wages in return for a 3 percent increase in staffing.
IX. Unions and Prefabrication
The effect of unions on the use of prefabricated components has already
been addressed indirectly in the estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between labor and materials reported above. This is far from an ideal test of
the hypothesis that union work rules restrict the amount of prefabrication, as38
Table 8. Simulations of the effect of reducing union wages to nonunion levels under
union and nonunion elasticities for a typical office building subcontract
Union elasticities Nonunion elasticities









Percent change in labor
hours, total
0.8 -2.4
Percent change in labor
costs, total
-23.3 -27.1
Percent change in value
addedper labor hour
-0.7 2.539
this elasticity also reflects factors such as building design and engineering.
A more suitable approach is to compare the usage of prefabricated components
for union and nonunion contractors in a sample of technologically similar
structures. This can be done for 36 union and 8 nonunion hospitals and nursing
homes completed in 1976 and included in a BLS Construction Labor and Material
Requirements survey. The survey reports whether each of 15 different types of
prefabricated components was used in the project.
There is very little difference in the usage of prefabricated components
between union and nonunion contractors, as reported in Table 9.In eight of the
15 cases, union contractors are more likely to use the prefabricated component.
Recall that, according to BLS, contractual limits on prefabrication are most
widespread for sheet metal workers. Despite these limits, about half of the
union contractors used prefabricated air handling ducts and air conditioning
equipment and union contractors were more likely than nonunion contractors to use
prefabricated underfloor ducts. Thus, there seems to be, even in the case where
contractual language is most restrictive, little union impact on prefabrication.
Another way to examine this question is to use probit equations to estimate
the effect of unions on the probability that a particular type of prefabricated
component is used. This allows the impact of exogenous variables that may be
correlated with union status to be held constant. These variables include average
hourly earnings, square footage of the building (both in logs), and binary
variables indicating region (3), location in an SMSA, whether the building is an
addition to an existing structure, whether the building is a nursing home, and
whether the building is owned by a government or public agency. The union
coefficients for each of these 15 equations are reported in the last40
Table 9. Percentage of projects using prefabricated components, by


































(S.E.) Union Nonunion Type of prefabrication
Special prefabricated components
Pre-cast concrete walls 17 12
Air handling ducts 47 75








Plumbing pipe 'trees" or electrical
conduit "trees"






Toilet partitions 69 38
Steel joists 39 25
Windows 67 88
Concrete forms 33 25














column of Table 9. All but three of these coefficients are positive, indicating
greater use of prefabrication by union contractors. The largest coefficients
are those for air conditioning equipment, plumbing pipe or electrical conduit
"trees", windows, concrete forms, hung ceilings, roof and floor decks, and
underfloor ducts. However, most of the union coefficients are smaller than their
standard errors, which means that, despite the surprisingly large number of
positive coefficients, this evidence cannot reject the hypothesis of no
difference in the use of prefabricated components between union and nonunion
contractors.
In summary, the direct evidence on prefabrication is fully consistent with
the indirect evidence on elasticities of substitution between labor and materials.
Both sets of evidence indicate no restrictive impact of union work rules on the
choice of materials or the usage of prefabricated components.
IX. Conclusion
There are five major empirical results in this paper:
(1) The elasticities of substitution among different skill categories
of labor and the own-price elasticities for each category are much
lower in union than in nonunion construction.
(2) The elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs
and own-price elasticities for nonlabor inputs are about the same in
union and nonunion construction.
(3) Labor is separable from nonlabor inputs in school construction
but not in office building construction. Even when this lack of
separability in the latter case is taken into account, the former
results still hold. When separability restrictions are removed
in the office building sample, all types of labor income become
complements for each other. This indicates occupational jurisdictions42
in the union sector nay have a large effect on managerial
flexibility.
(4) A simulation based on a typical office building subcontract shows
that lower factor demand elasticities in the union sector result in
excess staffing of 3.2 percent, excess labor costs of 5.0 percent,
and excess total costs of 2.0 percent.
(5) Despite contractual provisions limiting prefabrication in some
situations, there is no difference in the use of prefabricated
components between union and nonunion contractors.
What emerges from this and earlier research by myself and others is the
following view of the impact of union work rules in construction. First, these
rules are rstricted mainly to the allocation of different types of labor and
tend to have little effect on the employment of capital or materials. This is
consistent with the BLS contract provision data as well as with the field work
of Bourdon and Levitt (who emphasize exclusive jurisdiction as the most costly
set of restrictions) and Haber and Levinson (who base only one-fourth of their
cost estimates on capital and materials restrictions). It is probably not a
coincidence that this finding mirrors Freeman and Medoff's results for manu-
facturing. Second, although the costs of such work rules are not as alarmingly
large as journalistic accounts and nonacademic studies suggest, sizable increases
in productivity would result from their removal. Third, the forces linking
unionism and efficiency are very complex, with tendencies pulling in opposite
directions simultaneously. Even with work rules raising costs by 2.0 percent
and higher wages raising costs by 9.3 percent (=.4x .233) in office building
construction, my earlier work has shown that productivity is sufficiently higher in43
the union sector to make unit costs competitive with open shop contractors in
some cases. Superior training and reduced hiring costs seem to override the
effects of work rules and wages.
Despite these appealing consistencies, these conclusions are subject to two
general classes of criticisms. First, the results rely heavily on a particular
functional form, the translog. These same issues were also explored with a more
restrictive econometric approach, the relative factor input form of the CES.
The results, available upon request, showed lower union elasticities of substitu-
tion between skilled and unskilled labor but higher union elasticities of
substitution between labor and capital for both office buildings and schools.
Clearly, work with less restrictive functional forms such as the generalized
Box-Cox or the Fourier may yield different results. The frontier cost function
approach is also applicable to union-nonunion elasticity comparisons (if you are
willing to believe there is no such thing as good luck in construction).
Second, this paper shows some union demand elasticities to be lower and
attributed this to union work rules. Since I have not produced an eyewitness
account or ballistics evidence, this boils down to guilt by association. One
way of 'proving union work rules cause lower elasticities is to compare
elasticities across different types of contractors and then see if the patterns
match up with those one would expect from the BLS contract provisions data
(e.g., lower sustitutability between labor and materials in plumbing and sheet
metal work). When I tried this with both translog and CES specifications, I found
most of the results to be inconsistent with production theory, presumably because
the data were being asked to do too much. Another appropriate procedure would
be to estimate elasticities on union work covered by project agreements (which
usually waive most restrictive work rules) and compare them to those for similar
work where the work rules are followed, but no such data are currently available.44
Footnotes
'"Plan for Construction Productivity StirsIndustry, Takes Aim at Unions,"
Wall Street Journal, 21 April 1983, Eastern edition.
2Demand elasticity comparisons could producemisleading signals about
managerial flexibility if the distributions of input prices for union and
nonunion contractors did not overlap and elasticities varied with input prices.
The former condition does not hold here. Union and nonunion contractors pay
the same prices for materials and capital in a given area. Although union
contractors do pay higher wages on average, many nonunion contractors pay union
scale or above.
3Attempts to estimate separate union and nonunion elasticities for particular
types of work (e.g., plumbing) were made, but the coefficients were either
inconsistent with production theory (e.g., upward-sloping demand curves, all
inputs complementary to each other) or much smaller than their standard errors.
4For an overview of the results of the entire BR constructionproductivity
project, see BR (1983).
58R (l982a) also dealt with provisions that increase labor costs suchas
overtime premiums, pay for time not worked, subsistence and travel pay, and
shift premiums. The effect of such rules cannot be examined here directly because
labor costs are not broken down in any detail. Although these provisions raise the
price of labor, they do not generally prevent contractors from making adjustments
in factor mixes to avoid such premiums and should have little or no effect on
demand elasticities.
6Even if an output measure were available, the factor demand decisions
of general contractors are not really comparable to those of subcontractors, as45
one of their major functions is coordination of the entire project. This is
reflected in a larger share of supervisory and administrative labor for
general contractors. In the office building sample, seven general contractors
hired only supervisory and administrative labor, and for 26 others this type of
labor accounted for more than 20 percent of their labor costs.
7All of the models were also estimatedover individual contractors with
positive labor costs. These completely disaggregated estimates are very similar
to those reported below and are available upon request.
8The values of -2nA are 38.7 for office buildings and 56.7 for schools.
Pooling of union and nonunion contractors can be rejected at the 99 percent
confidence level in both cases.46
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